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ABSTRACT 
The Hungarian parliamentary arena has witnessed major political scandals in the last few 
years with attempts at obstruction, the use of megaphones, whistles and provocative 
banners by the opposition and the application of a unique combo of parliamentary 
procedural rules including the line-up of the Parliamentary Guard by the government. Part 
of these events are ever-present anomalies of parliamentary work as obstruction is a well-
known phenomenon in the history of parliaments that the parliamentary procedures aim to 
limit. Another part of these events however are rather new elements of the Hungarian 
parliamentary arena introduced and induced by the reform of parliamentary rules in 2012-
2014 and lead to the reconfiguration of opposition-government dynamics and to an ongoing 
debate about how parliamentary rules reshape and perhaps limit the opposition’s structure 
of opportunity (see Szente, 2015; Szabó, 2017). In this paper, I aim at discussing how 
opposition-government dynamics changed as a result of parliamentary reform which entails 
the enactment of the Act XXXVI of 2012 on the National Assembly and the Resolution 
10/2014 (II. 24.) OGY on certain provisions of the Rules of Procedure. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Hungarian parliamentary arena has witnessed major political scandals in the last few 
years with attempts at obstruction, the use of megaphones, whistles and provocative 
banners by the opposition and the application of a unique combo of parliamentary 
procedural rules including the line-up of the Parliamentary Guard by the government. 
Some parts of these events are ever-present anomalies of parliamentary work as the 
obstruction is a well-known phenomenon in the history of parliaments that the 
parliamentary procedures aim to limit. Another part of these events however is the new 
elements of the Hungarian parliamentary arena introduced and induced by the reform of 
parliamentary rules in 2012-2014 and led to the reconfiguration of opposition-
government dynamics and to an ongoing debate about how parliamentary rules reshape 
and perhaps limit the opposition’s structure of opportunity (see Szente, 2015; Szabó, 
2017). In this paper, I aim at discussing how opposition-government dynamics changed 
as a result of parliamentary reform which entails the enactment of the Act XXXVI of 2012 
on the National Assembly and the Resolution 10/2014 (II. 24.) OGY on certain provisions 
of the Rules of Procedure.  
In the international literature there is an increasing attention paid to parliamentary 
rules and institutional changes (see Sieberer-Müller, 2015; Garritzmann, 2017) especially 
because the direction and the nature of these changes affect the strategy of parliamentary 
actors on the floor (Sieberer et al, 2016). This connection between the regulatory 
framework and the strategy of actors can be documented in Hungary where the protest-
focused communication of the opposition is met by the strengthened disciplinary powers 
of the Speaker. Based on the theory of nested games (Tsebelis, 1990) that is used to 
describe to complexity of the parliamentary game, I argue that the structure of 
opportunity of the opposition is not only determined by the parliamentary rules and 
procedures but by their use (as in how the opposition can profit form the available 
resources) and application (as in how the government can apply the rules to limit these 
opportunities) thus the analysis of the legal framework needs to be complemented by 
behavioural aspects about how actors play the parliamentary game. The focus on 
parliamentary rules raises further questions about the conceptualization of opposition as 
the concept in itself is highly political and is not used in legal texts that rather talk about 
MPs and (qualified) minority.  
Thus, the first part of my paper will deal with some theoretical considerations about 
how to connect the legal concepts to the political realities in order to define opposition in 
a given context and about which subset of parliamentary rules should be studied. The 
second section of my paper will be dedicated to the analysis of those subset of rules with 
special attention to the changes occurred in 2012-2014. Along with the analysis of rules I 
will present data about the use of the available tools and also about the application of the 
rules. My goal is to track the change in opposition-government dynamics prompted by the 
reform of the parliamentary rules.  
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THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT THE CONCEPT OF OPPOSITION 
What is parliamentary opposition? As Garritzmann notes we lack a theory of political 
opposition (2017:2) since the opposition is usually understood in a negative way as the 
non-governing part of the parliament. However, as Andeweg (2013) has demonstrated it 
is hardly a stable definition, since in certain political context, the opposition becomes 
blurred or following Dahl (1966) it loses its distinctiveness. It can happen when 
opposition parties support the government or when governing parties oppose the 
government or when opposition parties provide structural support to a minority 
government and even when the government anticipates an opposition majority in 
another institution of the government. Thus, it seems that opposition is a blurry political 
concept that is further weakened by the decrease in partisan conflict that distinguishes 
government and opposition parties, which was observed by Andeweg – De Winter and 
Müller (2008) in relation to post-consociational democracies. While this theory of the 
waning of political opposition can be critiqued  (see for example Loxbo-Sjölin, 2017), 
many studies point out that opposition behaviour is dependent on a complex set of factors 
including systemic and party specific features such as the need to differentiate themselves 
from the government (Tuttnauer, 2018), the government-types (Christiansen-Damgaard, 
2008), the MPs’ socio-demographic background (Steinack, 2011), the bill specific features 
such as the ideological significance of the bill (Mújica-Sánches-Cuenca, 2006) and even 
regime-types (Franklin, 2002). 
Focusing on rules, there is a need to give a more exact definition of our understanding 
of the opposition. Following the conceptualization of Sieberer and Müller we can regard 
opposition as a minority group in the parliament, which in terms of parliamentary 
processes emphasizes the role of minority rights: “Minority rights are particularly 
important as they distribute institutional power along the most important line of conflict 
within parliaments – the one between the governing majority and the opposition.” 
(Sieberer-Müller, 2015:998). This conceptualization is in line with how legislation, in our 
case the rules of parliamentary procedure, standardizes opposition as the application of 
“opposition tools” are often linked to a qualified minority (for example 1/5 of MPs can 
promote the establishment of a committee of inquiry). Clearly, this approach cannot 
capture the party level of opposition that can be useful in order to map resources for 
opposition activity (Kopecky-Spirova, 2008) but on the other hand, is better fit to 
understand the dynamics of an unstable opposition arena such as the Hungarian case. 
In terms of legal procedures, “opposition tools” such as control tools are not 
conceptualized in terms of qualified minority but rather as the right of individual MPs. 
Both approaches to the opposition’s rights - the qualified minority and the MP level – are 
open concepts in the way that being in opposition is not a prerogative to possessing those 
given rights: government MPs can also ask the government interpellations (which 
actually they often do) and a given group of government MPs can form a committee of 
inquiry to, say, evaluate the wrongdoings of a previous government. How do these levels 
interact then?  
The parliamentary level focuses on the institution itself. According to Montesquieu’s 
doctrine of the separation of powers, the role of the parliament is responsible for the 
legislation and the control of the government. The capture of the parliament by the 
government which typically controls the majority of mandates imposes a threat on its 
autonomous functioning because it hinders the effective execution of these parliamentary 
functions. This idea is widely explored in the literature propagating the decline of 
parliaments (for a critical review, see Baldwin, 2004). Still, in order to approximate the 
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doctrine of the separation of power, it is not the parliament in itself but rather a qualified 
minority that is enabled through constitutional and other legal warrants. As Smuk (2016) 
points out based on the case study of the German Federal Constitutional Court decision 
(2 BvE 4/14) the opposition is a political and not a legal phenomenon thus it is the 
minority and not the opposition that should be granted the rights to control the 
government. The puzzle of the German case was what happens if the opposition is smaller 
than a minority required for accessing those tools. The Court’s decision underlines that 
the separation of powers is based on the imperative of an effective opposition meaning that 
the opposition should have the necessary tools and measures to realize its parliamentary 
deliberative and control functions.  
The MP level focuses on the role of the elected representatives in the parliamentary 
process. In legal terms, all MPs have the right to attend the parliamentary debates, to 
participate in the formulation of policies and to control the government. Thus, as I 
indicated above these are not “opposition rights” but rather MPs’ rights and MPs operate 
along a complex set of drivers out  of which one of the most important ones is the need 
for reelection. Reelection is a complex game again since it depends on various agents such 
as their parties and their electorate. Their expectations cannot always be derived from 
the opposition/government position even if it is about MPs’ activities on the 
parliamentary floor. As Proksch-Slapin (2015) demonstrate parties play an important 
role in allocating speaking time to their members and that speaking time is in high 
demand thus government parties not only hinder opposition MPs from speaking but they 
do so also with their own representatives. Thus, it is important to assess how MPs actually 
behave and what they do. Also, MPs not only have rights assigned but also obligations that 
are often restrictive in terms of debate and control. In order to understand the MPs’ 
opportunity structure in its complexity, we should take into consideration how the 
government uses tools of disciplinary control on the floor.  
This complex set of rules and drivers calls for a complex approach to research:  
 first, the opposition’s structure of opportunity is examined to evaluate the array of 
tools available to the qualified minorities and MPs; 
 second the actual application of those tools is examined to see how the opposition 
goes about its “opposition business”. The analysis of the application of the tools 
available tells us about how useful they are regarding the imperative of an effective 
opposition; 
 third, the rules regarding disciplinary power should be examined to see what type 
of obligations they are and what the sanctions are to make MPs follow the lines, 
what the tools are to curtail obstruction attempts. 
Based on the theory of nested games (Tsebelis, 1990) that many researchers use to 
describe to complexity of the parliamentary game (Sieberer et al, 2011), I argue that the 
structure of opportunity of the opposition is not only determined by the parliamentary 
rules and procedures but by their use also as in how the opposition can profit form the 
available resources; their application as in how the government can apply the rules to 
limit these opportunities.  
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THE CHANGING OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE OF THE OPPOSITION IN HUNGARY 
In order to capture the most important elements of the opportunity structure of the 
opposition as well as its potential dynamic of change, Garriztmann proposes an 
encompassing index that attempts to quantify and measure the degree of freedom of the 
opposition that I will use as a starting point for the analyses of the Hungarian case. The 
index reflects on the basic functions of the opposition – control, influence on legislation 
and the (re)presentation of political alternatives – which will be explored in the following 
sections. Many of these dimensions have been thoroughly explored in previous 
publications (Ilonszki-Jáger,2011, Ilonszki-Várnagy, 2018), but the enactment of the Act 
on the National Assembly in 2012, the reform of parliamentary procedures in 2014 along 
with their amendments since then make the revision of changes necessary. Moreover, I 
will address some additional dimensions that are missing from this framework, mainly 
the disciplinary powers.  
 
CONTROL FUNCTIONS 
The traditional monitoring tools are interpellations, prompt questions and oral questions 
used by Members in a plenary sitting. Out of these three, interpellations are the most 
important ones as the representatives vote on the response given and if the Parliament 
rejects the response a committee report is drawn up and submitted for debate at a plenary 
session. The change of the parliamentary rules did not modify the regulation of these 
tools, so our expectation is that we cannot track disruptions in the use of these tools after 
2014.  Figure 1 depicts the use of the tools which did not follow a clear pattern in the 
previous cycles and while we can witness an increase in the number of oral questions 
presented on the floor, it is a trend that had been present before 2014.  
 
Source: Website of the Hungarian Assembly, www.parlament.hu 
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The Members of Parliament can also make speeches before and after the orders of the 
day with the former being broadcast by radio and television. Regarding the trends, we can 
conclude that in the 2014-18 parliamentary cycle, the speeches after the orders of the day 
became significantly more popular among MPs. The increase can be attributed to the fact 
that the access to the plenary has become more limited after 2012 and also to the increase 
of the number of  independent MPs’ sitting in the Parliament as they can access this form 
of communication while speeches before the orders of the day can only be tabled by the 
members of PPGs.  
 
 
Source: Website of the Hungarian Assembly, www.parlament.hu 
 
Committees of inquiry are also the inherent tools of exercising control. They can be 
formed by the Parliament following a motion tabled by one fifth of the MPs. While before 
the parliamentary reform such proposals were automatically accepted, the new 
regulation introduces a new requirement stating that committees of inquiry can only be 
formed in case the given case cannot be sufficiently explored through interpellation and 
that the plenary vote on the proposal is needed for the establishment of the committee. 
The change had a clear effect on the formation of such committees after 2014 as none 
were formed during the last parliamentary cycle in spite of the relatively high number of 
proposals submitted. Based on the data presented in table 1, it is important to note that 
in spite of not needing a plenary vote on the proposal, the establishment of committees of 
inquiry was often sabotaged during the process even before the reform: in many instances 
the proposal on the establishment was not tabled, or the committee was not able to be 
formed due to the absence of its members or the plenary failed to accept the report 
suggested by the committee.  
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Table 1. The proposals to establish a committee of inquiry 
Among the control 
tools, MPs have the 
right to initiate 
policy debates: 
based on a motion 
submitted by one-
fifth of the MPs, the 
Parliament holds a 
policy debate on the 
policy topic 
identified in the 
motion. Table 2 
indicates that there 
is a growing 
popularity of the 
debates after 2014 
although the trend is 
not clear as the tool 
was also widely 
applied in the 2002-
2006 parliamentary 
period.  
Source: Magyar, 2018 
 
Table 2. Policy debates submitted broken down by submitter 
Source: Website of the Hungarian Assembly, www.parlament.hu 
To sum up, we can observe a certain shift in the use of control tools in the Hungarian 
Parliament: while the use of the various type of questions has not changed much, the 
requirement of a plenary vote basically killed off the committees of inquiry which 
prompted MPs to turn towards other resources of floor time such as speeches outside the 
orders of the day and policy debates. 
 
LEGISLATION AND DEBATE 
The legislative process of the Hungarian National Assembly underwent major changes 
according to the Law on the National Assembly. Figure 3 depicts the current legislative 
process which is different from the former process in three ways: first, the scope of bills 
requiring a qualified majority of two thirds of MPs was modified. While the increase in the 
number of supermajority bills points to the importance of cooperation with the 
parliamentary minority, the fact that after 2010 the minority was only strong enough to 
block the legislation of 2/3 bills for three years between 2015 – 2018 suggests that the 
governing parties are not always limited by this institution. Thus, the analysis of the 
 Initiator Proposal  Establishment  Formation  Report 
1
9
9
0
-
1
9
9
4
 Government MPs 11 0 0 0 
Opposition MPs 13 1 1 0 
Total 24 1 1 0 
1
9
9
4
–
1
9
9
8
 Government MPs 2 1 1 0 
Opposition MPs 25 6 5 3 
Total 27 7 6 3 
1
9
9
8
–
2
0
0
2
 Government MPs 8 4 4 1 
Opposition MPs 16 2 0 0 
Total 24 6 4 1 
2
0
0
2
–2
0
0
6
 
Government MPs 8 5 3 0 
Opposition MPs 20 9 9 1 
Committee 1 1 1 0 
Total 29 15 13 1 
2
0
0
6
–
2
0
1
0
 Government MPs 3 2 0 0 
Opposition MPs 14 6 1 0 
Total 17 8 1 0 
2
0
1
0
-
2
0
1
4
 Government MPs 6 5 5 4 
Opposition MPs 16 2 1 1 
Total 22 7 6 5 
2
0
1
4
-
2
0
1
8
 Government MPs 0 0 0 0 
Opposition MPs 23 0 0 0 
Total 23 0 0 0 
Submitter 
1990-
1994 
1994-
1998 
1998-
2002 
2002-
2006 
2006-
2010 
2010-
2014 
2014-
2018 
Government 3 1 2 0 3 0 4 
Governmental parties 0 2 2 5 2 4 1 
Opposition parties 2 10 11 22 5 6 17 
Total 5 13 14 27 9 10 22 
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adoption of bills requiring qualified majority is not part of this paper as it would not 
reflect on the opposition’s structure of opportunity but rather on the political context in 
which the government operates. 
The second critical change introduced is the shift of the detailed debate from the 
plenary session to the so-called “designated committees” that are assigned to each bill by 
the House Speaker. Thus, after a general debate which usually consists of the introduction 
of the policy and main guidelines of the legislation, the meticulous work of dissecting the 
proposal partly along the emerging policy alternatives and of partly along the introduced 
amendments takes place in committees. In this phase the committees make also decisions 
about the introduced amendments. While it could strengthen the role of committees in 
the decision-making process and enable MPs to contribute to the debate without the 
added pressure of the media and public attention, the data on the total number of 
committee meetings and the amount of time spent in committee meetings actually 
decreased by almost 45-50%  from 2010-2014 to 2014-2018 (Országgyűlés Hivatala, 
2018). This decrease along with the growing responsibility of committees rather suggests 
that the work of committees became even more simplified supposedly by the widespread 
use of political voting without meaningful debate.  
The third major change was introduced to the process following the committee phase. 
A new committee, a Committee on Legislation was founded that enjoys a high political 
status since it reviews the amendments adopted in committees, its own amendments and 
combines the original bill and its modifications into a single proposal. This single proposal 
called the summary of proposed amendments is to be discussed on the plenary floor. It 
means that most of the amendments will not reach the plenary floor by themselves, only 
if they were successfully integrated in the single proposal. While the MPs can request the 
debate of a certain amendment on the floor, the parliamentary bottleneck prompts the 
actors to only revise the viable proposal and not waste time on amendments that are not 
supported by the committees thus by the government. This shift towards the revision of 
the viable document (along with the committee reports though) weakens the potential of 
presenting-, revising-, and debating alternatives and diverting policy ideas.  
Also the presentation of a single proposal, the summary of proposed amendments can 
change the dynamics of voting – while MPs had the chance to express their detailed 
opinion through the vote on amendments before, now the stakes of expressing opposition 
are higher not because it threatens the vote on the bill but rather because the discontent 
MP can only refuse the bill as a whole. In case of popular decisions, this routine makes it 
hard to express nuanced criticisms (such as “I like the idea but not the realization”). Also, 
it is hard to differentiate between the acceptance and the rejection of certain amendments 
as voting is done en bloc, about all of them. It is even more problematic if we take into 
consideration that the Committee on Legislation can propose an amendment to the bill 
three hours before the opening of the sitting when the final vote is scheduled leaving very 
limited time for MPs (and their experts) to revise the new, modified proposal. 
While time as a scarce resource is the explanatory factor behind many parliamentary 
reforms, its use is also the most criticised aspect of the reform as the legislative process 
seems to have gathered speed leaving very limited time window for debate. In the 
Hungarian National Assembly there are three types of special procedures that can 
accelerate the legislation process: 
 The proposal of urgency can be submitted by at least twenty- five MPs and can be 
applied no more than six times within half a year. By adopting the proposal the 
time frame between the day of ordering and the final vote on the legislative 
proposal can be shortened to six days.  
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Figure 3. The legislative process of the Hungarian National Assembly   
A legislative proposal is submitted. 
Legislative proposals may be submitted by the President of the Republic, the Government, 
parliamentary committees and MPs (Parl. Res. 10/2014, §31). 
 
The Speaker designates a committee to hold a detailed debate on the proposal (hereinafter known 
as the designated committee) (Parl. Res. 10/2014, §32 (1)). 
A general plenary debate is held (Parl. Res. 10/2014, §34). 
 
A detailed debate is held in the designated and co-operating committees (hereinafter known as the 
reading committees). During the debate, committees vote on proposed amendments, support them, 
uphold them with changes or may formulate additional planned amendments. (Parl. Res. 10/2014, 
§43-44). 
The reading committee adopts an amendment which closes the detailed debate and submits it to 
the Speaker with its final report on the detailed debate (Parl. Res. 10/2014, §45) 
Parliament upholds amendments (Parl. Res. 10/2014, 
§48(6)). 
The Committee on Legislation sends the Speaker the combined language of the legislative proposal 
and the summary of proposed amendments (herein-after known as the unified proposal) signed by 
the proposer (Parl. Res. 10/2014, §46(10)). 
The Committee on Legislation forms an opinion on the amendments adopted in committee with the 
close of the detailed debate. It combines the amendments adopted in committee with the close of 
the detailed debate and its own proposals into a single proposal (hereinafter known as the 
summary of proposed amendments). It sends the Speaker a report on the close of the reading and 
on the contents of the summary of proposed amendments (Parl. Res. 10/2014, §46). 
A plenary debate is held on the committee reports regarding the detailed debate, on the summary 
report and on the summary of proposed amendments (Parl. Res. 10/2014, §47). 
The Committee on Legislation submits a second 
summary of proposed amendments (the combined 
language of the summary of proposed amendments and 
the upheld proposed amendment) and a second unified 
proposal (the combined language of the legislative 
proposal and the second summary of proposed 
amendments) (Parl. Res. 10/2014, §48(7)). 
Parliament decides on the second summary of proposed 
amendments (Parl. Res. 10/2014, §49(2)). 
Parliament does not uphold amendments (Parl. 
Res. 10/2014, §48(6)). 
A non-designated committee (hereinafter known 
as the co-operating committee) may submit a 
request to the Speaker to join in the debate of any 
provisions of the legislative proposal that fall 
within its scope (Parl. Res. 10/2014, §32(2)). 
Parliament decides on the summary of proposed 
amendments (Parl. Res. 10/2014, §48(1)). 
Final vote (Parl. Res. 10/2014, §50) 
Before a proposer may request a 
postponement of the vote if they wish to 
submit a proposed amendment in 
preparation for the vote. 
final 
vote, 
The proposer explains his/her position on the 
amendments proposed in committee (Parl. Res. 
10/2014, §46(1)). 
Proposed amendments may be submitted 
by MPs. /excepting the proposer to his/her 
own motion/ (Parl. Res. 10/2014, §40(1)). 
Source: www.parlament.hu 
POLITICAL SCIENCE ONLINE · 2019/2 · STUDIES 
  
10 
 
 The proposal for exceptional proceeding requires the supporting signatures of at 
least one-fifth of the Members and can be applied four times in half a year. The 
deadline for submitting the proposals for amendment shall not be less than three 
hours after the decision ordering the exceptional procedure 
 upon the proposal of the House Committee, the National Assembly may decide, to 
derogate from the provisions of the Rules of Procedure with the votes of at least 
the four-fifths of the Members present. This derogation can affect either the course 
of the discussion and/or the decision-making on specific matters. 
The resulting quickening in the legislation process and its consequences have been 
discussed in earlier work (Ilonszki-Várnagy, 2018) while its consequences regarding the 
quality of the political debate and the ensuing quality decision-making is to be explored 
further (see the report of the Corruption Research Center Budapest, 2015 for an early 
attempt). 
Following the reasoning of Szente (2018), we can relate the problem not only to the 
opposition but to the government MPs as well. On the one hand, plenary time becomes an 
even more scarce resource among governmental benches. On the other hand, the growing 
number of bills introduced by government MPs suggests that political debate is avoided 
not only in relation to the opposition but also in relation to politicians of its own. These 
routines chip away from the right to debate of all MPs in the Parliament. The lack of 
sufficient time to debate bills is not a Hungarian phenomenon, in her expert review of 
arrangements for allocating time to proceedings on bills, Newson (2017) concludes that 
the time spent on scrutinising a bill should be increased. This question clearly touches 
upon the issue of efficient changes and redistributive changes (Tsebelis, 1990). As 
Sieberer and Müller state: “The process and outcome of institutional reforms depend on 
the question whether actors are affected equally by institutional changes. … Efficient 
reforms benefit all actors involved in the reform process irrespective of their position in 
political competition (e.g. their government status or their position in the party 
hierarchy). Distributive reforms, on the other hand, strengthen some actors at the 
expense of others – i.e. actors are affected differently depending on their position in 
political competition.” (Sieberer-Müller, 2015). The overview of the changes in the 
legislative process suggest that while these reforms clearly helped to address the 
parliamentary bottleneck, the need for such frantic legislation can itself be questioned 
and the redistributive nature of the reform is undeniable.  
 
THE CHANGES IN THE DISCIPLINARY POWER OF THE PARLIAMENT 
One of the main changes in the legislation concerning parliamentary work was the 
strengthening of the disciplinary powers that are mainly practised by the Speaker of the 
House. According to the new rules, the functions of the disciplinary power is to secure the 
undisturbed proceeding of the sittings, to safeguard the reputation of the National 
Assembly and the chair and to safeguard the measures taken by the Speaker. One of the 
main drivers behind the change was to hinder obstruction and also to enable the Speaker 
to deal with the new methods of communication occurring in the Hungarian Parliament 
such as the use of megaphones, banners and such. This phenomenon is not exclusively 
Hungarian: Bell (2017) notes that the introduction of large numbers of amendments or 
sub-amendments appears to be a prevalent obstructionist tactic.  
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Table 3. Disciplinary measures in the Hungarian Parliament 
MPs activity Decision 1 Decision 2 Decision 3 Legal Consequence Legal remedy 
The MP deters from the subject 
of the speech in a clearly 
unreasonable manner. 
First warning to 
focus on the given 
topic 
Second warning 
to focus on the 
given topic 
Withdraw the 
right to speak 
The MP can not have the floor again 
on the same sitting day, in the course 
of discussing the same item on the 
orders of the day. 
 
The MP used up all the 
timeframe available for him/her 
or for his/her parliamentary 
group. 
Withdraw the 
right to speak 
(giving the cause 
of the withdrawal) 
       
The MP uses an indecent term 
or a term offending the 
reputation of the National 
Assembly or any person or 
group. 
Reprimand the MP 
In case of 
repetition, 
withdraw the 
right to speak 
  
The MP cannot have the floor again 
on the same sitting day, in the course 
of discussing the same item on the 
orders of the day. 
 
The MP uses a term 
ostentatiously offending the 
reputation of the National 
Assembly or any person or 
group 
Exclusion of the 
MP without 
warning 
The National 
Assembly takes 
vote without 
debate on the 
proposal for 
exclusion 
If the National 
Assembly has 
no quorum, the 
chair of the 
sitting shall 
decide on the 
exclusion. 
The Member excluded from the 
sitting day shall not have the floor 
again on the same sitting day.  
The Member excluded from the 
sitting day shall not be entitled to 
remuneration for the day of 
exclusion. 
At the next sitting of the National 
Assembly the chair of the sitting 
shall inform the National Assembly 
of the exclusion and its reason. 
Then the National Assembly shall 
decide without debate on the 
lawfulness of the decision taken by 
the chair of the sitting. 
The MP objects to the decision 
or the conducting of the sitting 
by the chair (except for making 
a procedural proposal) 
Withdraw the 
right to speak 
without warning 
    
The MP shall not have the floor again 
on the same sitting day, in the course 
of discussing the same item on the 
orders of the day. 
The MP, whose right to speak has 
been withdrawn without calling 
and warning, the committee 
responsible for the interpretation of 
the provisions of the Rules of 
Procedure to take an ad hoc 
position. 
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MPs activity Decision 1 Decision 2 Decision 3 Legal Consequence Legal remedy 
The MP seriously violates 
the reputation or the order 
of the National Assembly, or 
infringes by his or her 
conduct the provisions of the 
Rules of Procedure.. 
Reprimand the MP 
and give a warning 
of exclusion 
Exclusion of the MP for the 
remaining part of the sitting 
day. 
The remuneration payable 
to the Member may be 
decreased 
  
The MPS excluded from the sitting day 
shall not have the floor again on the 
same sitting day.  
The Member excluded from the sitting 
day shall not be entitled to 
remuneration for the day of exclusion. 
The Parliamentary Guard shall be in 
charge of the enforcement of this 
prohibition 
At the next sitting of the 
National Assembly the chair of 
the sitting shall inform the 
National Assembly of the 
exclusion and its reason. Then 
the National Assembly shall 
decide without debate on the 
lawfulness of the decision taken 
by the chair of the sitting. 
The MP exerts physical 
violence at the sitting of the 
National Assembly, 
threatened with or called for 
direct physical violence, or 
hindered the taking out of 
another person.  
Exclusion of the 
MP from the 
sitting day.  
The remuneration 
payable to the 
Member may be 
decreased.  
The National Assembly takes 
vote without debate on the 
proposal for exclusion 
If the 
National 
Assembly has 
no quorum, 
the chair of 
the sitting 
shall decide 
on the 
exclusion.  
The MP excluded from the sitting day 
shall not have the floor again on the 
same sitting day.  
The MP excluded from the sitting day 
shall not be entitled to remuneration 
for the day of exclusion. 
The Parliamentary Guard shall be in 
charge of the enforcement of this 
prohibition. 
At the next sitting of the 
National Assembly the chair of 
the sitting shall inform the 
National Assembly of the 
exclusion and its reason. Then 
the National Assembly shall 
decide without debate on the 
lawfulness of the decision taken 
by the chair of the sitting. 
Suspension of the 
exercising of the 
Member’s rights in 
case of repeated 
conduct. 
    
The MP shall not attend the sittings of 
the National Assembly, shall not 
participate in the work of the 
parliamentary committees and shall 
not receive remuneration.  
The Parliamentary Guard shall be in 
charge of the enforcement of this 
prohibition. 
The MP against whom a 
policing measure has been 
applied by the chair of the 
sitting may submit an objection 
to the committee on immunity, 
incompatibility, discipline and 
mandate 
In case of disturbance taking 
place at the sitting of the 
National Assembly of such 
extent that makes the 
continuation of the 
discussion impossible  
The sitting may be 
suspended for a 
definite period or 
may be closed by 
the chair of the 
sitting. 
If the chair of the sitting is 
unable to announce his or 
her decision, he or she shall 
leave the chair and the 
sitting shall be interrupted.  
If the sitting has been 
interrupted, the sitting shall 
only continue upon the 
Speaker convening it again.  
    
The MP may request that the 
Committee on Immunity, 
Conflict of Interest, Discipline 
and Mandate Control would? 
rescind a decision. 
 
Source: Website of the Hungarian Assembly, www.parlament.hu
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Table 3 presents the arsenal of disciplinary tools available to the Hungarian 
Parliament, most of which can be applied by the Speaker. Based on the new legislation we 
can observe a growing disciplinary trend: in the 2010-2014 cycle there were 15 votes on 
proposals to decrease the remuneration of MPs (affecting 40 MPs in total) , in 2014-2018 
there were 22 while in the current parliamentary cycle (2018-2022) there have already 
been 45 such proposals.   
This shift from debate to discipline is clearly problematic. While the causes and 
consequences are hard to distinguish namely, if it is the government that wishes to silence 
further the opposition or if it is the new communication style that prompted the changes 
to guard the reputation of the Parliament, the outcome is clear: an only person, the 
Speaker of the House can decide on what he deems acceptable and suitable for 
parliamentary debate. If we consider that at the time of the reform tools to question these 
decisions were not available, we can clearly see the redistributive nature of the reform. 
Although, on 13 February 2014 the Parliament passed an amendment to the Parliament 
Act, modifying the rules of disciplinary procedure for MPs introducing the possibility for 
a fined MP to seek a remedy before a committee, it does not solve our original concern 
about who is entitled to overrule the representatives in the House.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The overview of the reform of the rules of the parliamentary game and its changes after 
2012-2014 depicts a rather strict picture of the parliament where it seems, the 
interference of the oppositions is rather seen as an inconvenience and bother to the 
smooth business of legislation. While we can observe changes that have a minority-
friendly aspect, the fact that the government has enjoyed supermajority for all but 3 years 
since 2010 modifies our understanding of current affairs. Still most of the introduced 
changes are rather majority-friendly and enable the majority to dominate the 
parliamentary process. 
The problematic nature of opposition has been pointed out by various case-studies (De 
Giorgi-Ilonszki, 2018) but my analysis brings to light one yet understudied aspect of the 
institutional framework: the disciplinary tools. These tools are important because they 
affect MPs as individuals and thus their effect is direct (while the effect of the increase of 
qualified minority rule is indirect). They also shift the opposition-government dynamic, 
influence the nature of their conflict towards value-based evaluations and assessments. 
In case we conceptualize the opposition as MPs or group of MPs whose role is to control 
the government, the adequate answer is not discipline but accountability. Of course, in 
this shift it is not only the government who is to blame since the opposition is clearly 
changing its communication and often attempts to use the plenary floor as a theatre stage 
where conflict and spectacle sell. But the narrowing of the structure of opportunities will 
hardly change the political culture for the better, instead it will prompt some further 
conflicts which will soon be undebatable in their nature thus truly unfit for the 
parliamentary floor.  
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